The Other Side of the COIN:
Minimum and Exemplary Force
in British Army Counterinsurgency
in Kenya

HUW BENNETT

Defence Studies Department, King’s College London at the Joint Services Command and
Staff College, Shrivenham, UK

ABSTRACT This article argues that the British government’s deliberate exclusion
of international law from colonial counterinsurgencies allowed the army to
suppress opponents with little restraint. The oft-assumed national inhibitor,
the principle of ‘minimum force’, was actually widely permissive. As a result
exemplary force was employed to coerce the Kikuyu civilian population in Kenya
into supporting the government rather than the insurgents. Apparently random
acts were thus strategic, and emerged in three forms: beatings and torture,
murders, and forced population movement. The article argues that such harsh
measures were seen as necessary and effective; they were a form of indirect policy
and did not arise from a disciplinary breakdown.

Introduction
The military stages of the Kenya Emergency, from October 1952 until
November 1956, represent an important example of a successful, large-
scale and modern counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign. Alongside
other security forces, the British Army deployed nearly 10,000 troops in
its efforts to defeat the Mau Mau insurgents who came from the Kikuyu,
Embu and Meru populations of around 1.5 million people.¹ In the
course of the conflict, over 20,000 were killed and more than 150,000
placed in detention.² The campaign may be divided into four periods.
The first phase began with the declaration of a state of Emergency on 20
October 1952, and lasted until General Sir George Erskine assumed
command on 7 June 1953. Due to a lack of intelligence and settler
demands for harsh action, the Army participated in forced population
movement, screening and the exemplary use of violence against civilians. The second phase, from June 1953 until April 1954, was characterised by Erskine’s development of an operational plan. The third phase started in April 1954 when the army directed the Emergency’s biggest screening operation, ANVIL, in Nairobi. The programme to villagise virtually the entire Kikuyu people was equally important in defeating Mau Mau in this phase. The fourth phase lasted from January 1955 to November 1956, with operations directed against the remaining groups in the forests. In May 1955 General Sir Gerald Lathbury assumed command, developing special forces tactics. With Dedan Kimathi’s capture on 17 November 1956, the military campaign effectively came to an end.

While the Kikuyu people continued to be targeted after June 1953, this article focuses on the types of violence evident in the first phase of the campaign, and the permissive legal framework that allowed it to dominate. This is because there is new evidence to suggest that the army’s hands were not as clean as has previously been assumed. In addition, the indiscriminate violence of the first phase has been portrayed as counter-productive and that subsequently more moderate policies led to military success. While the outcome of the conflict must be seen as deriving from all four phases, the analysis here argues that the first phase violence played an important role. This fits in with emerging trends in the academic literature on counterinsurgency, offering a re-evaluation of the normally-assumed basic humanity of the British approach. Studies are beginning to question the notion that the concept of minimum force was integral to the British tradition and largely explains its success. Some scholars employ models of organisational adaptation to argue that exemplary, punitive force against whole populations resulted from incompetence and mistakes. But this article agrees with what Mahnken labels the ‘revisionist view’ in questioning the centrality of minimum force. As Jackson states, ‘...fear of the use of state force – played a large part in persuading many people in colonial campaigns to cooperate with government’.

The argument proceeds in four parts. In Part One, the contention that Britain violated international law is examined, referring to the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and the Geneva Conventions. It is argued that the former applied in its entirety in Kenya from 23 October 1953 until 24 May 1954, when the government lodged reservations. But the Convention was ineffective in restraining the army because the harshest repression happened before June 1953 and there is no evidence that anyone countering the insurgency in Kenya knew it applied. The section then analyses whether the 1949 Geneva Conventions revolutionised COIN, as they promised to. The government ensured Geneva’s impotence by obstruction at the negotiating table, adopting the view that insurgents were illegitimate opponents and delaying
ratification. But the British position was neither exceptional nor a perversion of international law. The secondary literature assumes that the replacement for international law in restraining the military was national and organisational culture, evident in the concept of minimum force. This claim is re-assessed in Part Two, where it is argued that due to being clearly laid out in doctrine, professional journals and Staff College syllabi, the concept was prevalent and influential. Conversely, minimum force clashed with draconian legislation introduced when Emergencies were declared. Oversight looked more impressive in theory than in reality, while the definition of ‘minimum’ stayed deliberately ambiguous, and thus malleable. Part Three shows how the limitations in law and doctrine translated into allowing repression in Kenya. In the opening phase, the army prioritised protecting white settlers from massacre by insurgents. Fear was deployed as a strategic lever, emerging in three connected forms: beatings and torture, murder, and mass evictions. The first was systematised in the ‘screening’ process, involving close army collaboration with the police and administration. Beatings and torture arose from an urge to gain intelligence and as a means of ‘dominating’ an area. Hundreds of people were ‘shot while attempting to escape’, possibly a euphemism for murder. The statistics on these killings suggest something is amiss. On arriving in Kenya, Erskine found widespread indiscriminate shooting by the army. Beatings, torture and murder further facilitated the evictions of tens of thousands from the Rift Valley, initiated by settlers but soon adopted as official policy. The army helped punish the Kikuyu and remove them from settler inhabited areas. The article’s concluding part argues that indiscriminate force did not simply result from a collapse in military discipline. Rather, violence against the Kikuyu was encouraged. From Cabinet level down, repression was believed to be the best way to deal with an insurgency.

Part One: International Law and British COIN

In her book on the Kenya Emergency, Elkins asserts that Britain violated the European Convention on Human Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Forced Labour Convention and the Geneva Conventions. Yet the moral outrage permeating her account is not supported by an analysis of whether these agreements applied in this context. When the objective is to understand how atrocities arise, the prevailing legal framework warrants scrutiny. It is argued here that, amongst a myriad of other causes, the perceived irrelevance of legal limitations on the use of force is a powerful facilitator of atrocity.

Although the British government resisted international law’s encroachment into counterinsurgencies in its own way, structural flaws within international law itself allowed this. For example, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not a binding agreement upon states. Instead, it is a general statement of intent without the power of a mandatory treaty. In addition, the British government was aware of the potential breach of the Forced Labour Convention, but legally circumvented it by engaging detainees on works related to ending the Emergency. However, there is substance to Elkins’s accusations regarding the European Convention and the Geneva Conventions.

The European Convention on Human Rights

In March 1951 Britain ratified the European Convention on Human Rights, extending it to Kenya on 23 October 1953, just over a year into the Emergency. Simpson depicts an enthusiastic Foreign Office clashing with a suspicious Colonial Office. Colonial Office mandarins viewed the Convention as pointless for Britain, the mother of liberty who instinctively protected freedom. The Convention attracted virtually no attention in Britain at the time. It is completely absent from the Army’s East Africa Command files and the likelihood of officers and soldiers being aware of its restrictions during the Emergency is virtually nil. In any case, as only inter-state complaints were allowed until 1966, nobody in Kenya could have effectively invoked the Convention. As other European powers also found themselves embroiled in counterinsurgencies during this period, they were disinclined to make complaints about Britain, and in fact did not. Derogations were allowed during emergencies, and the government placed a late derogation on 24 May 1954. Certain things were still inviolable, such as the right to life, and freedom from torture and slavery. Therefore, from 23 October 1953 until 24 May 1954 the army was restrained by the European Convention, and to a lesser extent after this date. However, two important factors must be remembered. First, the army never mentioned this restriction, so the Convention cannot have constrained the use of force in any conscious sense. And second, as argued below, the worst atrocities took place between October 1952 and June 1953, when none of the legal protections applied.

The Geneva Conventions

At first sight, Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions promised to revolutionise counterinsurgency campaigns, extending basic protections to non-combatants in internal wars. This sub-section shows how the government participated in the negotiations leading to the Conventions with reticence, displayed hostility towards Common Article 3, and delayed ratification until 1957. As a result, soldiers knew virtually nothing about the international legal restraints on their actions, largely because the government deliberately marginalised them.
While praising the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for its work in World War II, the government distrusted its interference in national security, fearing State sovereignty would be undermined. The Foreign Office contemplated attending the conference for the benefit of other countries:

... the horrors of the war in Europe showed that much needs to be done to uphold decent and humane standards and as the Power with far and away the best record of all the belligerents I think we ought to be ready to speak at all these meetings.

Despite these intentions, the British missed the preparatory meetings in Stockholm. Diplomats only arrived in Geneva after a last-minute decision. Under Sir Robert Craigie's leadership, the delegation constantly proposed amendments and achieved unpopularity for its 'obsessive and niggling' attitude. These problems largely stemmed from misgivings about the consequences for internal security and counter-insurgency in the colonies. Even two years before signing, the government anticipated the impact of an internal war clause, such as on the campaign then underway in Palestine. The government attempted to limit the applicability of Common Article 3 in the colonies by delegitimising their opponents. A report for the Army Staff College course of 1947 decried the 'campaign of violence, terror, sabotage and murder' waged by 'illegal armed organisations' in Palestine. The Security Service was ‘... concerned to ensure that we were not handicapped in dealing with such a situation as existed in Palestine’. Whitehall viewed the insurgency in Palestine as: ‘...terrorists campaigning against law and order’. It was thus assumed that international law would not apply in the colonies even before Britain signed at Geneva.

While Palestine influenced thinking beforehand, Malaya loomed large during the talks themselves. Common Article 3 provoked lengthy and sometimes acerbic discussion. Craigie reported that ‘... the desirability of applying the Conventions to civil war is accepted by all countries except the United Kingdom’. After much obstruction and argument, constructive engagement finally ensued. The Cabinet found Common Article 3 acceptable provided the sovereign power decided whether the clause applied to a conflict. Despite the absence of this formula from the final text, Craigie predicted that in practice the sovereign power would have the last word. This interpretation conveniently prevented ‘subversive movements’ gleaning encouragement from the article. Several months after the signing ceremony, the Army Council expressed concern though:

... we may come under pressure to apply Article 3 of the Conventions in Malaya and would find the application of the Article in full extremely objectionable and possibly restrictive to the operations.
However, this concern was mitigated by the Foreign Secretary’s interpretation that ‘... the Article was not meant to apply in the case of ephemeral revolts or disturbances of the bandit type’.31 Thus, the government easily dismissed its counterinsurgency campaigns from Geneva’s orbit.

Delaying ratification until 1957 consolidated the Conventions’ irrelevance. To be sure, there were other reasons for postponement. For example, clauses on prohibiting the death penalty, extending leniency in trials of foreign nationals, and incorporating penal sanctions into domestic law proved troublesome.32 Protracted inter-departmental deliberations resulted whenever another country ratified with reservations.33 The War Office, Foreign Office and Lord Chancellor’s Department all blamed the Home Office, responsible for ratification, for the delay.34 The Home and War Offices found difficulties in converting a treaty into domestic law.35 According to Best, the requirement to incorporate into domestic law was not appreciated until very late in the day.36 However, technical problems were expected, with an inter-departmental committee meeting several times prior to the signing, with a draft Bill ready in 1952.37 Best also points out that the legislative timetable was busy and the Geneva Conventions Bill was a low priority given the demands of post-war reconstruction.38 In 1952, for example, the Housing Bill assumed greater importance.39 Although Best offers a valid explanation, delaying ratification also conformed to concerns about the ramifications for national security. There were voices in government calling for ratification, such as the Lord Chancellor, and sections of the Foreign and War Offices.40 But these voices never proved loud enough to expedite ratification.

Was the British government’s position unreasonable and exceptional? In fact, the international legal regime allowed for such an interpretation. Before Common Article 3, the laws of war did not apply to internal conflicts. In international law, internal conflict exists in three escalating categories: rebellion, insurgency, and belligerency. Only under belligerency do the laws of war apply.41 Crucially, belligerency must be formally recognised by either a third state or the official government.42 This requirement, obviously detrimental to insurgents, resulted from the relationship between the emergence of modern international law and the rise of the state.43 States could thus crush revolts in any manner they chose.44 Recognition of belligerent status was seldom bestowed in practice, last happening in 1902.45 When the Conventions were drafted many states expressed concern over the ramifications of Common Article 3 for sovereignty.46 Therefore, the compromise term ‘non-international armed conflicts’ was adopted. The meaning of the phrase was deliberately ambiguous, an official definition not emerging until 1997.47 Furthermore, delegates differed on the level of violence necessary to trigger the
article, although they agreed that the insurgents should possess a degree of organisation, including a coherent command structure, and be able to adhere to the article themselves. Even the article’s supporters admit it has not fared well and is easily avoided.

The evidence presented shows that a considerable weight of legal opinion thinks Common Article 3 inapplicable during the Kenya Emergency, and even if it had been, the article affords quite limited protections. The Army therefore retained the legal freedom to employ exemplary repression in Kenya against the whole Kikuyu population.

Part Two: Minimum Force

Besides international law, moderating influences on the use of force emanate from national culture. In the British case, such an influence resided in the army’s organisational culture, in the concept of minimum force. While the concept is found in international law in the principles of proportionality and discrimination, the British army developed a distinctive view of it.

The Prevalence of the Minimum Force Concept

Minimum force originated in English common law, and allowed the executive to restore the peace with no more force than strictly necessary. The common law obliged citizens, including soldiers (technically citizens in uniform), to help enforce order when required. During disturbances, it was a commander’s duty to open fire if he could not otherwise halt the violence, and he had to use enough force to be effective. During insurrections, the duty to stop violence by force applied most strongly. Thornton argues that the concept derived from national culture, mainly from two sources: pragmatism and ‘Victorian values’. These values were translated ‘via a quartet of socializing media: the ideal of empire, the class and public school systems, and popular culture’. Rather than developing a complicated doctrine the army extolled individual decision making, with minimum force as a simple rule to follow in all situations.

The army thought the concept produced results. Whereas mass casualties alienated the population, avoiding them helped win their support. The Staff College course thought reprisals against the population ‘... patently unjust and uncivilised’. ‘Respect ... is necessary: respect is achieved by law and order applied fairly and promptly’; and would mean that the ‘... inhabitants will gradually drift apart from guerrillas’. However, the course recognised the difficulty in assessing the appropriate degree of force:
Generally speaking, success in battle depends upon the use of overwhelming force at the correct time and place. For internal security operations the reverse applies, since the most important single principle is that of minimum force. 63

This position is reflected in the key 1949 booklet *Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power (IPDACP)*:

> There is ... one principle that must be observed in all types of action taken by the troops: no more force shall be applied than the situation demands. 64

At the Staff College the principle was often iterated, for example in 1947: “To enforce law and order no one is allowed to use more force than is necessary.” 65 A January 1949 article in the *British Army Review* encouraged ‘discipline and behaviour [that was] absolutely correct’, ‘fair play’, and ‘the minimum force necessary to achieve your object’. 66 An article from 1950 stressed the importance of restraint. 67 In riots the use of firearms was the last resort, for example, in self-defence. When used, a specified number of single shots were directed at ring-leaders and intended to wound. 68 The Staff College course also enjoined ‘rigid discipline’ when conducting searches. 69

There is therefore clear evidence that the concept was specifically laid down, taught at the Staff College and discussed in the professional journals. Furthermore, employing excessive force was criminalised. 70 Enforcement came through the courts, which could scrutinise military activity after the event. 71 This position was taught at the Staff College, where officers were told that self-discipline and the soldier’s ‘high code’ safeguarded them from prosecution. 72 Raghaven argues that supervision by the civil power and fear of punishment ensured the concept became a reality. 73

Mockaitis posits the expanding role of minimum force in doctrine. Initially, the *Manual of Military Law* distinguished between riots, where the concept applied, and insurrections, where it did not, but the distinction became increasingly blurred. 74 Moreman concurs, pointing out how ‘colonial warfare’ transformed into ‘imperial policing’ after World War I. 75 In Mockaitis’s view the turning point came in the 1934 publication *Notes on Imperial Policing*, where the War Office stipulated that when fighting rebels away from civilian areas the principle was irrelevant, but when dealing with riots or other situations where the innocent were inseparable from the guilty, minimum force applied. 76 Mockaitis argues that final consolidation occurred in 1949 with the publication of *IPDACP*, cited above. 77

*Conceptual Problems with Minimum Force*

The common law basis of minimum force is undeniable. However, in counterinsurgency situations it came into effect alongside emergency
laws, originating in Ireland in the nineteenth century. These suspended incompatible laws, including basic liberties such as habeas corpus, so the impression that minimum force worked within a liberal framework is disingenuous. Carruthers thus criticises the Emergency legislation in Kenya as ‘sham legalism’.

‘Victorian values’ should be treated with scepticism. As Ellis argues, colonial warfare hardly conformed to ideas about ‘fair play’, considering: ‘... Africans were not quite human, and therefore beyond the pale of Imperialist morality’. Indeed, Thornton’s argument about national characteristics relies too heavily on rose-tinted, anecdotal evidence. The assertion that they remain static over centuries is flawed, ignoring altering social norms driven by technology, immigration and other factors. Rather, the Empire and British society were highly pluralistic, bringing into question the notion of a monolithic ‘imperial culture’.

Mockaitis’s case for the concept’s ubiquity is supported by the Staff College evidence. However, he exaggerates the extent to which minimum force always applied. Official thinking supported greater latitude in the use of force in dealing with insurrections than riots; and insurgencies were insurrections and not riots. Even by 1958 the Manual of Military Law stated that: ‘The existence of an armed insurrection would justify the use of any degree of force necessary effectually to meet and cope with the insurrection’. Both doctrine and practice allowed a far greater degree of force in the colonies than in Britain. IPDACP noted how: ‘The degree of force necessary and the methods of applying it will obviously differ very greatly as between the United Kingdom and places overseas’.

Mockaitis contradicts himself by admitting that two textbooks taught at Sandhurst and the Staff College advocated harsh early action to nip trouble in the bud, in contrast to minimum force. In 1949 the Colonial Office admitted the concept clashed with practice in the colonies: a number of Colonies (notably in Africa) have on their Statute Book collective punishment Ordinances which provide that this form of punishment may be used to deal with offences such as cattle stealing and the like... There are, however, the more difficult cases of the present disturbances in Malaya, and (to quote the most obvious example) the use of punitive bombing in the Aden Protectorate... what might be described as ‘collective punishment’ has been used [in Malaya] – e.g., the burning of villages, and so on – and may well be used again.

IPDACP recognised that collective punishment contravened minimum force, but regarded this as ‘inevitable’ and ‘a necessity’. The concept was further limited by who decided exactly what the term meant: the commander present at the time. As only soldiers knew the power of their weapons, and the commander was present, he alone decided the degree of force appropriate. In this sense, the concept’s meaning was uncertain and arbitrary, which was considered inevitable. In addition,
although soldiers remained answerable to the courts, in practice they were hardly ever called to account after putting down insurrections.90 The 1947 Staff College course taught that so long as commanders believed their actions to be correct, they need not fear an enquiry.91 In order to protect soldiers, the government usually passed an Act of Indemnity afterwards. This was ‘... a statute intended to make transactions legal which were illegal when they took place, and to free the individuals concerned from legal liability’.92 Therefore, the idea that the military were subject to rigorous civilian oversight and dreaded prosecution is misleading.

This section has shown how the concept of minimum force somewhat replaced the lack of concern with international law within the army. The concept derived from common law, found clear doctrinal and educational expression and was theoretically enforced by civilian oversight. However, the concept's importance is generally over-emphasised. Furthermore, common practices such as collective punishment were contradictory, and the commander could use almost any degree of force on condition that he justified it as necessary and minimum after the event to a civil power that hardly ever disagreed. Combined with the disregard for international law, the flexibility inherent in minimum force meant that the army could deem necessary a considerably greater degree of force than is normally acknowledged. The use of harsh exemplary force in the first phase of the Kenya Emergency highlights this argument.

Part Three: Exemplary Force

This section examines three types of behaviour towards civilians during the Emergency’s opening months: beatings and torture, murder, and forced evictions. At this time the army prioritised protecting the minority white settler population. Almost the entire Kikuyu population were considered troublemakers, with the government estimating in August 1952 that 90 per cent were Mau Mau members. The army characterised the tribe’s attitude as ‘sullen and unco-operative’.93 In consequence, the military means for combating the perceived threat were static defence of settler property, mobile patrols to kill Mau Mau groups, and measures to intimidate the population into moving away from vulnerable settler areas and shifting their support to the government. Fear became a strategic lever for combating the insurgency.

Beatings and Torture

From October 1952, the security forces were known to flog Mau Mau suspects.94 This occurred in the context of a dire lack of intelligence about
who supported the insurgency, and a mindset that deemed physical force legitimate. While there is no evidence of a direct order authorising abuse, one observer described it as ‘almost a routine measure’. Assuming command in June 1953, General Erskine discovered a ‘tendency to take prisoners and interrogate them with a view to extracting information by force’. Writing to the War Office, he observed: ‘I am quite certain prisoners were beaten to extract information’.

The typically combined screening operations were notorious for their violence. Army doctrine stipulated that soldiers surround an area, move those inside the cordon into cages, and mount guard whilst the civil authorities screened people for their political sympathies. The District Administration arranged screening teams, which included ‘hooded men’ – disguised informants whose opinions supplemented official sources. The teams assumed everyone guilty until proven innocent. All Kikuyu over the age of about 14 were screened at some stage. Elkins shows that the process commonly involved beatings and torture. Confirmatory evidence from Branch and Evans suggests the experience often proved brutal. The proportion of people beaten or tortured during screening will likely remain unknown. However, Governor Baring described how “… numbers of Africans were manhandled and the sympathies of loyal Kikuyu alienated.”

The operational reports for the first months are incomplete, so comprehensively cataloguing the army’s activities is impossible. However, the army clearly played an important part in screening. During 1952 the 1st Lancashire Fusiliers, various battalions of the King’s African Rifles (KAR) and the Kenya Regiment rounded up at least 5,892 people. A precise figure is elusive because reports sometimes record a ‘large number [of] arrests’. The experience must have been frustrating for soldiers as, despite rounding up large numbers, few arrests were made. After taking 3,800 prisoners during a raid in Nanyuki in November, only 87 were arrested. Sometimes no arrests were made. Nairobi noted how “… info restricts arrests on many occasions”. Screening continued into 1953. In the first three months, at least 2,059 people were collected by the Kenya Regiment, Lancashires, 4th KAR, 6th KAR, 23rd KAR, 26th KAR and East Africa Training Centre troops in the Central and Rift Valley Provinces, while securing arrests remained problematic. Besides identifying Mau Mau, the process aimed at displaying government power. A series of sweeps in North Nyeri and Embu in late June/early July stated the object: ‘… to obtain info, screen labour and generally dominate the area’. At this point the army deployed around 10,000 men in the Emergency areas, not all of whom were operational. Dominating the whole area continuously in a physical sense was impossible. The police were notorious for using their rifles first and asking questions later. A 1954 parliamentary
report noted their ongoing ‘brutality and malpractice’. Clayton views the Kenya Police Reserve (KPR) as the worst offenders. By 19 June 1953, the army and police in combined operations had screened at least another 11,933 people. The KPR frequently worked with the military; knowing precisely how often is impossible because the units involved are often unspecified. As mentioned, according to doctrine the army did not conduct the screening itself. There are four grounds for questioning the assumption that this vindicates the army. First, rounding up may have involved as much violence as screening, especially as time passed and people realised what being caught in the net entailed. Secondly, some army officers conducted questioning, via their integration in the Joint Army-Police Operational Intelligence (JAPOT) system. A directive from 28 May 1953 banned the running of screening teams or the conducting of interrogations ‘... which are at present being carried out, in some cases, by JAPOT officers’. Erskine noted how some of the screening teams used methods of torture. Thirdly, screening could not have happened without military help. Fourthly, the army directed the Emergency’s largest screening effort: Operation ANVIL. Even when abstaining from mistreating people themselves, soldiers sometimes turned a blind eye to the excesses of the administration and the police, although the extent of this is obscure. The analysis of beatings and torture offered here suggests that this type of violence fell into a pattern and fulfilled a strategic purpose: showing the population what happened to those suspected of supporting the insurgency.

Murder

The civilian population also suffered from terrorisation by murder. On 27 April 1953 a detachment of 7th KAR, who had repeatedly beaten and robbed labourers on a farm near Nyeri, killed four men who ran when fired on. Their infuriated employer explained that running away was natural after recent Mau Mau attacks in the area. The army expressed regret and said the Provincial Commissioner was investigating, a curious decision as this should have been within the remit of the military police. On 20 April 1953, Governor Baring informed his superiors in Whitehall that:

430 Mau Mau terrorists or suspects have been shot while attempting to escape or while resisting arrest during the past six months. A number of these have been positively identified as wanted for murders and other criminal offences.

This came in response to a Colonial Office query, expressing an ‘unpleasant feeling’ about the number of reports mentioning Africans thus shot. Whitehall wondered whether this was a euphemism for unnecessary, indiscriminate shooting. Leonard Gill, a settler with
wide experience in the KPR, the Kenya Regiment and the KAR, recalls the phrase as slang for a suspect having been murdered. Rawcliffe suggests soldiers preferred killing suspects rather than risk them being liberated by a judicial system considered too lenient. In any case, the figures supplied by Baring do not add up. The available reports state that by 20 April 1953 the security forces had shot whilst attempting to escape or resisting arrest a total of 77 persons. Of these the army killed seven, wounded three and shot four with unspecified consequences. The police and other civil forces figures were, respectively, 17, 1 and 5. In the same period, a further 40 were shot by unspecified security forces (24 shot dead, nine wounded and seven shot with unrecorded results). Clearly, this is a major discrepancy with the figure provided by Baring on 20 April, but the killings continued after this date. The archives give no indication as to how he arrived at the 430 figure. In the next few days Baring provided the Colonial Office with additional statistics. They were just as confusing. The Home Guard had killed ‘47 Mau Mau terrorists’ while resisting arrest or attempting to escape, and another 12 were killed by the Home Guard and police together. Three days later Baring presented Whitehall with further information. The security forces killed 29 people who failed to halt after being challenged in the Prohibited Areas, created at the start of 1953. In the Special Areas, extant since 3 January, the position was that:

... 335 persons have been shot under the provisions of Emergency Regulation No. 22B while resisting arrest or attempting to escape, 270 of them in native land units and forest reserves, and 65 in settled areas. Of this total of 364 persons shot [sic], 224 have been identified subsequently as persons wanted for murder or other serious Mau Mau crimes. These figures do not conform to the number initially declared. The statistics in Erskine’s final report state that from 21 October 1952 until 18 April 1953, the security forces killed 522 and captured wounded 125. Could 430 of these have been shot attempting to escape? On the whole, the reports imply either confusion or concealment. Baring possibly issued the 430 figure in order to show he had the situation under control, or because the real figure was higher and he wished to down-play the extent of the killings. Evidence submitted to the McLean Inquiry further suggests illegal shootings. In a directive issued by Baring on 25 February, he noted that despite an increased number of kills inflicted in recent weeks, details ‘... have not, however, been reported as promptly as they should have been’. He required all kills to be notified to the nearest police station, which would pass the information up the chain of command. The wording is ambiguous, but could mean kills were not being recorded in some cases.

Another explanation for the shootings was that they happened due to panic or misunderstandings. It was one thing for Regulations to require...
people to stand still when ordered, but when many Kikuyu rightly feared rough treatment or prolonged detention (potentially without trial), it is not surprising that some ran away. For example, in late March 1953 a Kenya Regiment patrol shot dead a man carrying a panga who ran when challenged; a note from the authorities permitting him to carry the item was found on his body. In another incident, a man in the Thomson’s Falls area was shot dead leaving the forest. The patrol subsequently discovered he worked for the Forestry Department. Thus, the assumption that running away always implied guilt was flawed. Compounding the problem, hardly any soldiers spoke Kikuyu. The lingua franca of the KAR was Swahili, and information for arriving British battalions gave some key phrases in the language, including ‘simama’ for stop. In a raid in Kipipiri in December 1952 a Kenya Regiment soldier with a Lancashire’s patrol shot dead a man who ‘...ran away despite 3 orders to stop in Swahili’. The fact that British Army units were instructed to call people to halt in a language foreign to them, without teaching soldiers any basic Kikuyu, is telling.

While the number of these shootings will probably never be known, General Erskine soon realised the extent of the problem. His arrival in Kenya marked the end of the first phase, and he was in a good position to assess events in that period. After arriving in Kenya, he undertook a systematic tour of the troubled areas, meeting officials, settlers and Kikuyu chiefs in the Rift Valley Province, Central Province and Nairobi. These meetings caused him to issue an order on 23 June calling for tight discipline, according to a letter to his wife. In the same letter, Erskine stated that: ‘There had been a lot of indiscriminate shooting before I arrived and one of the first things I did was to stop the casualty competition which was going on’. Both the police and the army were implicated – in contrast to assertions by Clayton that the KPR were the sole culprits. In a letter to the Secretary of State for War in December 1953, Erskine was so concerned about the prospect of the impending McLean Inquiry examining army conduct in the early months that he thought ‘...the revelation would be shattering’. The letter continued: ‘There is no doubt that in the early days, i.e. from Oct 1952 until last June there was a great deal of indiscriminate shooting by Army and Police’. As with beatings and torture, a central reason for such action stemmed from the urge to intimidate the entire Kikuyu people. However, accidents, unclear rules of engagement, poor supervision and competition for kills were also factors.

Evictions

Government support for evicting ‘squatters’ from the Rift Valley accelerated the brutality of the campaign. For many years, hundreds of
thousands of Africans worked on white settler farms in the Rift Valley in return for small leaseholds. Many Africans regarded the Europeans as temporary residents, and unrest increased in the years before the Emergency. Not all settlers ejected the Kikuyu, but a substantial faction took advantage of the Emergency to remove large numbers, whom they considered a serious threat. Mau Mau were thought to frighten off other sources of labour, and evicting all Kikuyu was the answer. Evans argues that in addition to settler leader Michael Blundell’s advice to get rid of the Kikuyu, the police expedited the process. Today, this is termed ethnic cleansing and, as Valentino notes, it often occurs in reaction to a real, though exaggerated, perception of threat. In Kenya the clamour for action against the Kikuyu increased with every well-publicised, gruesome settler murder. For example, after Commander Meiklejohn was murdered in November 1952, the Lancashires helped remove 2,950 suspects from the area. Forcing people from their homes can require considerable coercion. In this respect, the widespread beatings, torture and shootings served not only to intimidate the Kikuyu generally, but to encourage their departure to the Reserves, mainly from the Rift Valley. Therefore, labelling the opening months as a ‘phony war’, as Heather and Percox have done, is inaccurate. The situation reports show that in the other two provinces under Emergency Regulations, Central and Nairobi, troops carried out patrols, screening and static duties, but were not offensively active as in the Rift Valley. According to Rawcliffe, settler actions became government policy in late November 1952. For example, in late November 4,324 Kikuyu were removed from the Thomson’s Falls District after Mau Mau murdered a European in Leshau. Screening and evictions shared a reputation for brutality. On 15 December, it became official policy to evict Kikuyu from areas where suspected Mau Mau offences had occurred. One observer decried the ‘frequent brutality with which the agents of law and order enforced the evictions’. This experience, exacerbated by the wretched conditions in the transit camps some Kikuyu passed through, swelled support for the insurgents. The overcrowded Reserves offered little relief at the end of the ordeal. By the end of April 1953 70,000–100,000 people had left the Rift Valley and Central Provinces for the Reserves, either through forcible eviction or voluntarily. Considering the general terrorisation of the population at the time, however, the word ‘voluntarily’ acquires a rather novel meaning.

The literature generally refrains from distinguishing between the various security forces in analysing the evictions. Apart from a contemporary reference to the ‘thousands of unwanted people’ carried away in ‘army lorries’, there is scant mention of the army. A report from Nairobi confirms the army assisted in ‘escorting Kikuyu expelled to Reserve from [the] Thomson Falls area’. This continued through
1952 and into 1953. In February 1953 the Lancashires started to ‘evacuate’ Kikuyu from around Ol Kalou in the Rift Valley. The operation lasted for several days, with hundreds moved. By the middle of the month commanders noted the deleterious effect of the ‘continued forcible evacuation’, promoting increased Mau Mau recruitment and outbreaks of lawlessness. Yet the movement to the Reserves continued nonetheless. A communication from Baring suggests the government refused to stop the flow in order to appease settler opinion, despite knowing it bolstered the insurgents and diverted efforts from offensive operations. Perversely, Baring argued that in order to avoid mass dismissals by farmers, the government would move them instead. A report by Major-General Hinde suggests the government feared the usurpation of state power. The Commissioner for the Rift Valley documented the ‘additional impetus’ given by ‘certain Kenya Police Reserve officers’ in the process. These were the men the army cooperated with so closely; such as in the combined removal of 500 people from Kariakor in Nairobi. As noted above, military intelligence officers participated in screening; in some cases they also undertook administrative tasks supporting evictions. Not until September 1953 did the government end mass ‘repatriation’ of people to over-crowded areas many had never seen before. By then the settlers felt more protected in their homes and the government had succeeded in isolating the ‘disease’ of Mau Mau from other tribes. General Erskine, who loathed the settlers, nevertheless thought that in purging the Rift Valley, the army’s job had been made easier.

This section has argued that for the Kikuyu, the first phase of the Emergency was far from a ‘phoney war’. The security forces prioritised protecting the settlers and viewed the entire Kikuyu population as suspect. Beatings were rife and carried out both to improve the poor intelligence situation and to intimidate people. Although we cannot be sure of the extent of illegal killings, the figures on people ‘shot trying to escape’ are suspect and support Erskine’s acknowledgement that indiscriminate shooting was widespread. The mass evictions, mainly in the Rift Valley, were catalysed by the Emergency, and the army participated in the process. It seems highly likely that the prevalent beatings, torture and killings were intended to speed up evictions. The next section will consider the arguments against viewing this opening phase as simply a breakdown in command and control.

Part Four: Understanding Exemplary Force – Beyond Poor Command

A common explanation in the secondary literature for the army’s brutality during the opening months blames a weak command and
control system.\textsuperscript{173} For example, Elkins describes the security forces as ‘a splintered group’ who each acted according to their own desires.\textsuperscript{174} Here Elkins exaggerates as the emphasis on combined operations in this article has thus far shown. However, Colonel G.A. Rimbault, appointed Personal Staff Officer to Baring at the end of December 1952, lacked the seniority and staff fully to coordinate operations. Rimbault’s appointment came after Baring’s request for a Director of Operations was turned down by the Colonial Secretary and the Chiefs of Staff, who did not think the situation warranted it.\textsuperscript{175} Baring recognised Rimbault’s ineffectiveness and next time went straight to the top, appealing to Churchill for a more senior commander.\textsuperscript{176} Major-General W.R.N. Hinde, appointed Chief Staff Officer to the Governor on 1 February 1953 and promoted Director of Operations on 11 April, similarly failed to coordinate effectively.\textsuperscript{177} Hinde initiated some major policies, and influenced Erskine’s understanding of the campaign. But he lacked both authority and a large, efficient staff organisation. Senior army commanders recognised the problem without making any quick remedial moves. For example, on 12 January 1953, General Sir Brian Robertson, responsible for East Africa as part of his larger Middle Eastern command, said lack of leadership and coordination were major problems.\textsuperscript{178} The Chief of the Imperial General Staff concurred after seeing the situation in Kenya for himself:

\ldots one Brigadier with an attenuated staff and no signals cannot exercise effective command over five equivalent battalions deployed on a Company or Platoon basis over an area about 130 miles long and 120 miles wide.\textsuperscript{179}

A striking feature in the archival record is the almost complete absence of reference from, or about, either General Robertson at MELF or General Cameron at East Africa Command. Neither of these men took any responsibility for events in Kenya, instead leaving a militarily inexperienced Governor to make decisions.\textsuperscript{180} Following Cameron’s report on 30 April and Nicholson’s on 16 May, the War Office decided upon Erskine’s appointment with increased powers.\textsuperscript{181} At the battalion level, the problem was worse in King’s African Rifles units, which were under-strength, including officers. The governments of East Africa slowly started increasing unit strengths after some prompting from the Colonial Office.\textsuperscript{182} When Erskine assumed command in June 1953 he criticised the normal practice of attaching small army units to the police and administration, on the grounds that it removed soldiers from the control of senior officers, with ‘evil results’.\textsuperscript{183}

This raises the question of whether military discipline effectively collapsed during the first phase of the Emergency. In the National Archives, the detailed records on discipline cover the problems
experienced in ‘B’ Company, 5th KAR.\textsuperscript{184} No other courts martial proceedings that took place during the Emergency are available, nor are any records relating to the Special Investigations Branch of the military police. However, three other sources permit a limited appreciation of the number and type of courts martial held during the first phase. The first of these is a report produced by the Judge Advocate General’s Office in response to a question asked in the House of Commons on the number of courts martial in Kenya since January 1952.\textsuperscript{185} The file gives the names of those tried, their units, the date and place of the trial, the charges and the sentence. Unfortunately, the date and place of the offence is not included. More importantly, many of the charges are vague, stating for example, ‘Section 40’, referring to the Army Act 1881. The report lists 37 court martials held between 20 October 1952 and 1 July 1953, summarised in Figure 1 below.

Of these, only 14 offences, those covered by Sections 18(5) and Section 40, might relate to violent crimes against civilians. They were committed by only ten individuals. Section 18(5) reads: ‘… any other offence of a fraudulent nature not before in this Act particularly specified, or of any other disgraceful conduct of a cruel, indecent, or unnatural kind’.\textsuperscript{186} Section 40 offences were ‘…any act, conduct, disorder, or neglect, to the prejudice of good order and military discipline’.\textsuperscript{187} There is no knowing from the information available whether these 14 offences were committed against Africans, European settlers or members of the security forces. The report is problematic for another reason: it only records charges brought against two members of East African units, despite the fact that by 1 July 1953, six battalions of the KAR had been on operations since the start of the Emergency, in addition to the Kenya Regiment, the East Africa Training Centre, the East Africa Armoured Car Squadron and the 156th (East African) Heavy Anti-Aircraft Battery. Surely this is an underestimation of the level of crime in these units. On 11 December 1952, Sergeant G. Skinner was convicted in Nairobi of a Section 40 offence, and punished with a severe reprimand and forfeiture of seniority.\textsuperscript{188} Sergeant W. Quayle suffered a reprimand and pay stoppages on 16 December in Gilgil for infringing Section 40.\textsuperscript{189} Another source, a list submitted to the McLean Inquiry, shows two further cases where soldiers were punished, although not in court, this time definitely for crimes against civilians. The commander of 70 Brigade reprimanded Second-Lieutenant Green of the Kenya Regiment, attached to 7th KAR, for assaulting a postmaster at Mweiga, on an unknown date. Major Sinclair Scott, 23rd KAR, was ‘… under investigation on a charge of bodily harm to an African on 29 Jan 53’. Interestingly:
The evidence was not sufficient to support the charge as there had been no clear directive from Higher Authority concerning disposal of prisoners. The C-in-C quashed the charge but saw the officer and impressed on him the importance of a correct attitude.\textsuperscript{190}

In other words, the officer escaped punishment not because he was innocent, but because there existed at the time no order prohibiting him from mistreating prisoners. This attitude is remarkable, and could well explain why there were so few courts martial in the opening phase. The available evidence, though incomplete, suggests that while the military authorities wished to preserve discipline in general, for example by charging men with insubordination, drunkenness and the like, mistreating the Kikuyu population was considered permissible. Therefore, the army was not out of control, but rather permitted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of offence</th>
<th>Number of offences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drunkenness</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indecency</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disobedience</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desertion</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threatening a superior</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence to a superior</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escaping</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sleeping on post</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housebreaking</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 11 [neglect to obey orders]</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 18(5)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 27(1) [false accusations]</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 40</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total offences</strong></td>
<td><strong>57</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1. Court martials in Kenya, 20 October 1952 to 1 July 1953

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indiscriminate, terrorising violence against the Kikuyu population. Policies such as screening and evictions impressed upon soldiers the idea that the Kikuyu should be coerced into dropping their support for Mau Mau. Often this required beatings, and sometimes torture and murder. The lack of a strong command system was seen as problematic because it hindered efficient repression, not because the army had got out of control and suffered from poor discipline. This interpretation is supported by the notes of the Cabinet Secretary on remarks made by Colonial Secretary Oliver Lyttelton in May 1953: ‘Opposn. case that repressive measures are driving loyal K. [Kikuyu] to M.M. [Mau Mau] – proved to be opposite of truth’. The direction of policy from the highest level therefore supported the exemplary use of repression against the whole Kikuyu population. The restraints imposed by international law and minimum force had little place in the army’s counterinsurgency in Kenya.

Conclusion
The argument presented in this article posits that it is time for a re-evaluation of the significance of minimum force in British counterinsurgency, as illustrated by the Kenya Emergency case. The army profited from the concept’s marked ambiguity and ineffective civilian enforcement mechanisms. Minimum force meant something quite different in insurrections and in the colonies. The army preferred to ‘nip trouble in the bud’, immediately crushing the insurgency with a heavy hand. Doctrine stated that ‘no more force shall be applied than the situation demands’. In Kenya, soldiers thought the situation demanded a great deal of force, and commanders were permitted to reach their own interpretations of the concept. Manifested in beatings, torture and murder, the pattern of violence suggests a deliberately indiscriminate targeting policy despite the absence of a direct order from the historical record. These two types of force were designed to intimidate, garner intelligence in an environment where the Mau Mau were not well understood, and speed up the eviction process, thus protecting the settlers. Top-level commanders in the first phase exercised a loose grip on the campaign compared to Erskine’s style later on. But this should not be mistaken for degeneration into unauthorised, random violence by soldiers gone wild. Soldiers were punished for mundane offences, but seldom for those against Kikuyu persons. Perhaps then, it is appropriate to regard the period from October 1952 to June 1953 as one where an unofficial policy of brutality emerged. Even if indiscriminate violence was not ordered – and it may be that such orders were destroyed or only given orally – the persistent failure to punish soldiers constituted a policy by default.
Contrary to some ahistorical assertions, these actions were not against international law as it stood in the 1950s. The calculated relegation of the European and Geneva Conventions precisely indicates the disdain the government held for insurgents and their determination to fight them with limited restraint. Yet such an attitude was hardly unusual, nor did it demand a complicated manipulation of international law. Without descending to genocide, the security forces, including the army, relied upon broadly indiscriminate repression to produce results. Today, minimum force has come to be seen as a guarantee of success in counterinsurgency operations. In Kenya in the early 1950s, exemplary force against the whole population from which the insurgency arose seemed the desirable course of action. Ultimately though, this course could not be sustained, and the question of whether decolonisation became a necessity as a result is still as pressing today as 50 years ago. The research results offered in this article highlight the need to dissolve any residual complacency about the dominance of minimum force and the requirement to evaluate its very meaning in the post-war period. But this should not lead to the outright rejection of minimum force as a useful analytical category, or the impression that British methods were as brutal as possible, even genocidal. In all four phases of the Emergency the army could quite easily have employed massive force and killed a much larger number of people had it wished to. The campaign was not one of annihilation, but of coercion against a whole population where the insurgents could not easily be identified. As the campaign progressed, and Mau Mau were driven away from the population into the forest areas, more discriminate force could be used. Without the early brutality though, this may never have come about.

NOTES
1. As the Kikuyu were by far the largest group and operations were directed mainly against them, the term ‘Kikuyu’ is used in this article to refer to the Kikuyu, Embu and Meru peoples.
12. Ibid. pp.17, 22.
13. Ibid. pp.4, 809, 824.
18. Ibid. pp.89, 100.
20. Joint Services Command and Staff College Archive [hereafter JSCSC]: Army Staff College syllabus, 1947.
22. Ibid. p.2.
28. NA: LO 2/674: Extracts from Sir Robert Craigie’s Report related to points raised in the Cabinet, 1949, para. 43.
30. NA: CAB 130/46: Memo from Foreign Secretary to the Cabinet, 25 Nov. 1949 p.11.
32. See the inter-departmental correspondence in: NA: LCO 2/4313.
34. NA: WO 32/18511: Army Council Secretariat extract from the conclusions of the 56th (51) meeting of the Cabinet, 30 July 1951; NA: LCO 2/4309: Undated commentary.
45. Ibid. p.19.
47. Moir, Law of Internal Armed Conflict pp.25, 31, 34, 42.
54. JSCSC: Army Staff College syllabus, 1947.
55. Ibid; Townshend, Civil Wars p.19.
56. JSCSC: Army Staff College syllabus, 1945.
58. Ibid. pp.74, 83, 89.
59. Ibid. p.75.
61. JSCSC: Army Staff College syllabus, 1947.
62. JSCSC: Army Staff College syllabus, 1948.
63. JSCSC: Army Staff College syllabus, 1949.
64. War Office, Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power (London: Army Council, 1949) p.3.
65. JSCSC: Army Staff College syllabi, 1947 and 1948.
68. JSCSC: Army Staff College syllabus, 1948.
69. JSCSC: Army Staff College syllabus, 1947.
71. Townshend, Civil Wars p.19.
72. JSCSC: Army Staff College syllabus, 1947.
74. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency pp.18, 24.
77. Ibid. p.25.
78. Simpson, Human Rights pp.78, 84.
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84. War Office, *Imperial Policing and DACP* p.5.
87. War Office, *Imperial Policing and DACP* p.35.
88. JSCSC: Army Staff College syllabus, 1947, ‘Commander’ denotes anyone in command of other soldiers.
89. Ibid.
91. JSCSC: Army Staff College syllabus, 1947.
92. JSCSC: Army Staff College syllabus, 1949.
95. Ibid p.68. Corporal punishment was only abolished as a judicial instrument in Britain in 1948. See Peter Hennessey *Having It So Good: Britain in the Fifties* (London: Allen Lane, 2006) p.86.
101. Ibid. p.325.
104. NA: CO 822/501: Note of a meeting held by Secretary of State, 15 Dec. 1952.
105. Reports were compiled by Force Nairobi and Northern Area. Force Nairobi reports do not exist for 9 Jan. to 3 Feb. 1953, and 24 April to 1 May 1953. There are no reports for Northern Area before 1 Feb. 1953.


122. NA: WO 32/15834: Letter from Erskine to Secretary of State for War, 10 Dec. 1953.


127. NA: CO 822/474: Memo by P. Rogers, 10 April 1953.


131. For example: NA: WO 276/468: Sitrep from Force Nairobi to Troopers and Mideast, 1 May 1953.


133. NA: CO 822/474: Telegram from Baring to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 25 April 1953.


139. IWMD: Erskine Papers 75/134/4: Booklet ‘Notes for British Units Coming to Kenya’, GHQ East Africa, no date p.42.

140. NA: WO 276/466: Sitrep from Force Nairobi to Mideast, 9 Dec. 1952. John Lonsdale has pointed out to me that most Kikuyu would have understood basic Swahili, but nonetheless the point about official complacency stands.

141. NA: CO 822/693: Letter from Erskine to Harding (CIGS), 14 June 1953.

142. IWMD Erskine Papers, Letter from Erskine to wife, 28 Nov. 1953.

143. NA: WO 32/15834: Letter from Erskine to Secretary of State for War, 10 Dec. 1953.


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156. Furedi, *Mau Mau War in Perspective* p.8; Berman, *Control and Crisis* p.349.


165. NA: CO 822/442: Savingram from Baring to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 24 Feb. 1953. John Lonsdale argues that this adoption of settler activities was common practice for the Kenya Government. Email correspondence with the author, 8 Aug. 2007.


170. Heather, *Counterinsurgency and Intelligence* p.128.


176. Ibid. p.56.

177. Percox, ‘British COIN’ pp.70–71, 73.


182. NA: CO 822/442: Extracts from Chiefs of Staff meeting, 10 April 1953.

183. NA: WO 32/15834: Letter from Erskine to Secretary of State for War, 10 Dec. 1953.


186. Army Act 1881.

187. Ibid.
188. NA: WO 93/56: List of CMs in Kenya. He was very likely seconded to an East African unit, as his given regiment, the Wiltshires, were not in Kenya at the time.
189. NA: WO 93/56: List of CMs in Kenya; Quayle was from the Lancashire Fusiliers, but specified as 'att. KAR'.
190. NA: WO 32/21721: McLean Inquiry Exhibit 22: List of cases where members of the Military Forces have been charged for offences against Africans, compiled by Assistant Adjutant General, GHQ.
192. War Office, Imperial Policing and DACP p.5.